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Abstract
Blockholder monitoring is central to corporate governance, but blockholders
large enough to exercise significant unilateral influence are rare. Mechanisms
that enable moderately-sized blockholders to exert collective influence are there-
fore important. Existing theory suggests that engagement by moderately-sized
blockholders is unlikely, especially when the blocks are held by delegated asset
managers who have limited skin in the game. We present a model in which mul-
tiple delegated blockholders engage target management in parallel, i.e., “wolf
pack activism.” Delegation reduces skin in the game, which decreases incentives
for engagement. However, it also induces competition over investor capital (i.e,
competition for flow). We show that this increases engagement incentives and
helps ameliorate the problem of insufficient engagement, though it can also foster
excess engagement. Under competition for flow the total amount of capital seek-
ing skilled activist managers is relevant to engagement incentives, which helps
to predict when and where wolf packs arise. Flow incentives are particularly
valuable in incentivizing engagement by packs with smaller members.
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1 Introduction
Economists have long recognized the key role of blockholder engagement in amelio-
rating problems arising from the separation of ownership and control. In particular,
Shleifer and Vishny (1986) argue that ownership of a large block by a single shareholder
enhances firm value, and more so the larger is the block. However, while blockholding
is widely prevalent in the U.S., most blockholders are not large enough to exert sig-
nificant unilateral influence in the face of recalcitrant management. Holderness (2009)
documents that 96% of U.S. firms have at least one blockholder with 5% ownership.
Yet, La Porta, Lopes de Silanes, and Shleifer (1999) document that 80% of the largest
U.S. firms lack any single blockholder with a stake of at least 20%, a level that they
argue generates effective control. Using data on a broader sample from Dlugosz et
al (2006), we find that fewer than 15% of U.S. firms have a 20% outside blockholder.
Mechanisms that enable non-controlling blockholders to exert collective influence are
therefore key to effective monitoring.
In this paper, we theoretically examine how parallel engagement by non-controlling
blockholders may arise. This question is interesting because, while the existing litera-
ture on multiple blockholders (Winton, 1993, and Edmans and Manso, 2011) suggests
that blockholders with moderate stakes are unlikely to engage in costly interventions,
the past two decades have witnessed a significant amount of simultaneous costly en-
gagement by holders of such blocks. Indeed, legal scholars allege that institutional
investors such as activist hedge funds engage via so-called “wolf packs,”1 in which mul-
tiple funds with small to moderate stakes (who do not act as a formal group) each
1See, for example, Briggs (2006), Nathan (2009), Coffee and Palia (2015). Interestingly, though
hedge funds are involved in a majority of debt restructurings in the US (Jiang et al 2012), we are not
aware of any evidence of parallel engagements amongst such creditors.
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engage in costly efforts to change firm policies.2 This process has been described as
“conscious parallelism” (Tevlin, 2016).
Block sizes in wolf packs range from around 8% to 9% (e.g., the 2013-2014 Sotheby’s
wolf pack involving Third Point, Trian, and Marcato) all the way down to around 1%
(e.g., the 2005 Deutsche Borse wolf pack involving, among others, eight activist funds
with stakes of 1% to 2%).3 Furthermore, such campaigns typically involve signifi-
cant costs for each activist. In addition to research costs and expenses incurred in
persuading management and other shareholders, significant costs arise from legal and
compliance risk due to SEC rules concerning communication between shareholders,
and/or potential lawsuits relating to undeclared 13D group formation.4 Importantly,
legal risks and associated costs attach to each participant in a wolf pack, regardless of
their size.
It is noteworthy that activist wolf packs involve institutional investors who manage
delegated blocks. Standard agency theory would seem to imply that, relative to block-
holders who invest their own capital (as in the existing theoretical models), holders of
delegated blocks like hedge funds should engage less because delegation by definition
results in lower “skin in the game.” What could explain the willingness of delegated
2A starting point of our analysis is that the actions of the different investors is formally unco-
ordinated. This is consistent with legal constraints in the activism process: U.S. disclosure rules
require investors to file together as a group when their activities are formally coordinated, which risks
triggering poison pills and thus restricts total group holdings.
3See Third Point LLC vs Ruprecht C.A. No. 9469-VCP (Del. Ch. May. 2, 2014) and Becht et
al (2017) for details. We are grateful to Julian Franks for providing us with further detail on the
Deutsche Borse case.
4Legal risk derives from two sources. First, the Security and Exchange Act (SEA) of 1933 defines
“proxy solicitation” expansively as any “communication to security holders under circumstances rea-
sonably calculated to result in the procurement, withholding, or revocation of a proxy.” Black (1990)
notes that this effectively covers any form of communication between shareholders, all of which are
subject to stringent anti-fraud provisions under SEA 14a-9. Second, SEA Section 13D requires any
person or groups of persons that owns 5% or more of a company’s shares to file Form 13D declaring
their intentions. This fosters an incentive for target managers to sue on the grounds of an undeclared
group, even if there is no evidence of explicit coordination.
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funds to take these types of costly actions that is not in the standard agency model?
We show that the desire to attract delegated investor capital, i.e., “competition for
flow,” can help ameliorate the problem of insufficient engagement.
When a blockholder invests only her own capital, her incentive to engage with man-
agement is limited to the impact on the value of that capital, even though successful
engagement positively affects all shareholders. In other words, engagement is a public
good and is therefore underprovided relative to the social optimum. A possible solution
to such a public goods problem would be to subsidize those who undertake socially valu-
able but costly actions at the expense of those who don’t. We show that competition
for flow creates an endogenous set of transfers across agents that (imperfectly) achieves
this goal. By undertaking a costly action—activism—to advertise her skill, a fund can
attract capital at the expense of other, non-engaging, funds. Flow thus endogenously
compensates those who undertake costly engagement. Such endogenous, decentralized
flows do not, however, perfectly replicate the social optimum. There may still be some
underprovision, while the possibility of attracting flow can also over-incentivize funds,
leading to socially wasteful excess engagement.
In our model there is a target firm that is partially owned by activist funds that
differ in their skill at engaging target management. Funds own blocks via a combina-
tion of proprietary (i.e., the fund’s own) and delegated capital. Delegated capital is
provided by investors who wish to reinvest with skilled funds, which provide a higher
continuation return. Investors observe the engagement actions of all activist funds and
the outcome of engagement, and (rationally) reallocate their capital to those funds that
they view as most likely to be skilled. Funds, in turn, receive fees for any capital that is
reinvested with them. As a result, funds are incentivized to compete for reallocatable
investor capital, i.e., flow. This setup is consistent with empirical evidence about hedge
4
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funds provided by Lim, et al. (2016), who show that indirect incentives deriving from
future fund flows are larger in magnitude than direct incentives coming from incentive
fees and returns from proprietary investment. Furthermore, Boyson (2008) finds that
performance persistence is more prevalent among smaller and younger hedge funds,
exactly those that Lim, et al. (2016) find are the most flow motivated.
As discussed above, if blocks are proprietary engagement is under-provided relative
to the social optimum. As delegated blockholders, funds differ in two key ways: (1)
they have less “skin in the game” and (2) they have an incentive to attract flow due to
their fee structure. The reduction in skin in the game exacerbates the underprovision
problem. Competition for flow, on the other hand, gives funds the incentive to engage
in order to advertise their skill. This delivers a unique feature of competition for flow
as a solution to under-engagement: with competition for flow, the total size of activist
capital becomes relevant to engagement incentives. For a given number of engaging
funds, the larger is the total pool of activist capital, the greater is the amount that
each fund can attract by advertising their skill. At an applied level, if we associate the
growth of activist capital in the model with the size of the activist industry, our model
thus predicts that wolf packs would be most common when the industry has grown
and matured.
Another unique feature of competition for flow is that its incentivizing effect is
most pertinent for smaller blocks. This is because, while a smaller block size directly
discourages engagement in the proprietary case, for a given amount of total activist
capital the relative per-blockholder gains from potential flow increase as blocks get
smaller. At an applied level, this makes our model well suited to the analysis of
parallel engagements involving smaller blocks.
The total size of activist capital clearly plays a central role in our analysis. We
5
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intentionally take the conservative approach that all available flow nets out across
funds, i.e., there is no capital flowing in from outside the model. As a result, the
impact of flow is self-limiting: the larger the number of funds advertising their skill by
engagement, the lower is the flow reward per fund, ceteris paribus. While this limits
the effect of competition for flow, we show that the incentivizing effect of competition
for flow can still sometimes overcome the negative effects of reduced skin in the game.
However, the engagement incentives stemming from competition for flow are not
costless. Unlike price appreciation from successful engagement, capital inflows are
excludable benefits for funds. As a result, we show that there are equilibria where
funds engage even when they know they are not pivotal: i.e., there is excess engagement.
Overall, we find that the positive welfare impact of increased engagement is likely to
dominate at higher engagement costs (such as those relevant for hedge fund activism),
while the negative impact of excess engagement is likely to dominate at lower costs.
In recent years the empirical literature in finance has taken an active interest in the
wolf pack phenomenon, beginning with Becht at al (2017). They provide an overview
of global hedge fund activism between 2000 and 2010 and document that as many as
a fifth of such events involve multiple activists intervening in parallel. They find that
wolf packs are associated with a greater probability of successful engagement and with
higher announcement returns when stakes are disclosed. Both of these findings are
broadly consistent with our model: for any given required level of engagement, the
probability of success is (weakly) increasing in the amount of activist capital present;
furthermore, as long as there is ex ante uncertainty about the required level of engage-
ment, the increased presence of activists will lead to larger increases in anticipated
firm value. More recently, Artiga Gonzalez and Caluzzo (2019) show that wolf packs
are more common in larger firms. This is also consistent with our model: a particular
6
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dollar value of capital held by a hedge fund will translate into a smaller block size for a
larger firm; thus, for a given level of required engagement, success will require a larger
number of engaging blocks.5
The papers in this nascent literature identify wolf packs using regulatory discosures
by multiple activists per target firm, which thus limits their scope (as Becht et al, 2017
recognize) to block sizes that cross the relevant reporting thresholds (5% in the US).
It is therefore likely that wolf packs are under-counted in the data, because anecdotal
evidence (e.g. the Deutche Borse example discussed above) suggests that they can
involve players that never cross the relevant reporting thresholds. In this context, it
is salient that our mechanism suggests that the flow motivation may be strongest for
exactly such relatively small participants. Thus, as the empirical literature finds new
ways (e.g., starting from 13F holdings data) to study the presence of smaller blocks
in parallel engagements, our results will be increasingly relevant. Furthermore, our
analysis also suggests that those hedge funds that have the strongest incentives to gain
reputation but cannot acquire larger stakes (i.e., smaller and younger funds) will be
most affected by the flow incentives that we identify.
1.1 Related theoretical literature
At a broad theoretical level our analysis is related to the large literature on blockholder
monitoring (surveyed by Edmans and Holderness, 2017). Papers in this literature tend
to focus either on blockholders who exercise “voice” by directly intervening in the
firm’s activities, or those who use informed trading, also called “exit,” to improve
5Other recent contributions include Wong (2020), who considers pre-filing trade, and He and Li
(2020) who show that social ties matter in wolf pack engagements.
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stock price efficiency and encourage correct actions by managers.6 Our paper belongs
in the former strand of the literature, and is most closely linked to papers that focus
on multiple blockholders. As noted above, these include Winton (1993) and Edmans
and Manso (2011), both of which show that intervention via voice is less likely when
blocks are smaller. We show that competition for flow among delegated blockholders
can ameliorate the underprovision of intervention, and especially so for smaller blocks.
Some papers within the multiple blockholders literature also examine how trading op-
portunities in a non-transparent market may be of key importance in facilitating or
incentivizing governance. For example, Edmans and Manso (2011) show that having
multiple blockholders can increase the effectiveness of governance via exit due to com-
petition among blockholders. In a similar vein, Cornelli and Li (2002) and Noe (2002)
show that small blockholders’ ability to generate trading profits in a non-transparent
financial market can encourage engagement or tendering. In contrast to these papers,
trading plays no role in our model.7 Further, none of these papers consider the effect
of delegation on engagement incentives.
Outside the multiple blockholder literature, Dasgupta and Piacentino (2015) con-
sider the role of delegation in governance but, unlike us, focus on exit as a governance
mechanism. They show that the threat of exit is weakened when the blockholder is
a flow-motivated fund manager. In that paper, the reduced skin in the game and
competition for flow arising from delegation work in the same direction: both reduce
the incentives to govern via exit. In contrast, the two forces oppose each other in our
model. While reduced skin in the game reduces the incentives to pay engagement costs,
6A few papers (e.g., Maug, 1998; Kahn and Winton, 1998; Faure-Grimaud and Gromb, 2004) allow
blockholders to choose between exerting voice and exiting.
7Another important but less related contribution to this literature is Zwiebel (1995), which mod-
els the sharing of private control benefits as part of a coalitional bargaining game, and derives the
equilibrium number and size of blockholders who try to optimally capture these benefits.
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thus exacerbating the underprovision of engagement, competition for flow engenders
an endogenous transfer mechanism that alleviates such underprovision.
Our paper is also related to the literature on free riding in takeovers, starting with
Grossman and Hart (1980). Many follow up papers have proposed possible solutions
to the free rider problem, the most relevant of which is Bagnoli and Lipman (1988),
who, like us, study a model with discretely sized shareholders who can be pivotal in
equilibrium. While some of the equilibria in our model have similarities to those in
Bagnoli and Lipman (1988), our focus on costly engagement (as opposed to costless
tendering) as well as delegation takes our paper in a very different direction.
2 The Model
Consider a publicly traded firm that is amenable to shareholder activism, in that value
can be created by inducing a change in management’s policies. Such a change can be
induced only if investors who own shares successfully engage with management. All
players are risk neutral and there is no discounting.
Ownership. The firm has a unit continuum of shares outstanding. Some of these
shares are held by activist funds in blocks of size b ∈ (0, 1) each. Each fund owns one
block and holds cash c > 0. The remaining shares are owned by passive shareholders
who neither engage nor invest in active funds. The ownership structure is common
knowledge at the beginning of the game (t = 0).
Shareholder engagement. The firm is characterized by η, a random variable that
measures the degree of difficulty in implementing changes in strategy. Two natural
sources of such difficulty—which may vary across firms—are the willingness of current
management to resist any proposed changes in strategy and the difficulty in convincing
9
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passive shareholders to vote with activists in a proxy contest. We assume that η is
distributed Uniformly on (b, U ] for some U > 1, and is publicly revealed at t = 1.
After observing η, each fund must choose (simultaneously) at t = 1 whether to
engage target management (a = E) or not (a = NE). We assume that engaging
the target is costly. This could arise from research costs and potential legal risks, as
discussed in the introduction.
Engagement succeeds if the measure of shares that engage is at least η. Given
success, the firm’s value at the end of the game (t = 2) will be P2 = Ph; otherwise
it will be P2 = Pl, which we normalize to zero.
8 This “threshold” characterization is
meant to capture the idea that, for any given level of η, there is some level of pressure
from shareholders that will induce a change in strategy.9 Our interest is in collective
engagement across multiple blockholders: this is captured in our assumption that η > b.
Skill. Activist funds differ in their skill (θ ∈ {S, U}) at engaging management. Funds
discover their engagement skills at t = 1. N funds are skilled (θ = S), and can engage
management at cost c, i.e., by spending their available cash. M funds are unskilled
(θ = U), and face an infinite cost for engaging management. We show in Online
Appendix B that the model’s qualitative results are similar if unskilled funds have the
same cost of engagement as skilled funds, but are unable to observe η.
We denote by α the total share ownership of skilled funds and by β the total share
ownership of unskilled funds, so that α = Nb and β = Mb. Thus α+β represents total
activist capital. At t = 2, after the engagement concludes, activist funds reinvest their
capital elsewhere. Skilled funds have a gross t = 2 reinvestment rate of return RS > 1.
Unskilled funds have a reinvestment rate of RU = 1. These should be understood to
8We discuss the implications of this normalization in section 5.3.
9Bebchuk et al (2019) document that many activist campaigns result in settlements rather than
in proxy fights. Accordingly, η does not necessarily correspond to a particular voting threshold.
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represent the value of payoffs from future engagements.
Skin in the game. Funds hold blocks using a combination of delegated and propri-
etary capital. In particular, each block of size b is made up of: (i) a fraction φ ∈ (0, 1)
from the fund’s proprietary capital, i.e., its “skin in the game”; and (ii) a fraction 1−φ
from a continuum of (randomly matched) identical investors who give capital to the
fund to manage, i.e., delegated capital. For example, for a hedge fund, φ represents
general partner investment while 1− φ represents limited partner investment.
Competition for flow. Funds are evaluated by their investors at t = 2, after the
outcome of engagement is determined. Investors in each fund observe η and the actions
of all funds.10 They then update their beliefs about the skill of all funds, and all
delegated capital is reallocated to the set of funds that share the highest posterior
probability of being skilled. The reallocated capital is spread evenly among all such
funds. We thus limit reallocatable capital to the amount of delegated activist ownership
of the target firm. In other words, we exclude from reallocation funds’ skin in the game
and their initial cash holdings (in effect, funds never invest their proprietary capital
in other funds) as well as capital held by passive investors. Since we show later that
capital reallocation provides a potential solution to the collective engagement problem,
limiting the size of such reallocatable capital works against us.11
Fund fees. At t = 2, after capital is reallocated, each fund earns a proportional
assets under management (AUM) fee, w ∈ (0, 1), on delegated capital. We define f i2,
i ∈ {1, ...,M +N}, as the t = 2 value of delegated capital allocated to fund i, so that
fees earned at t = 2 are wf i2. The fund then reinvests all available capital—including its
10Since our investors are best interpreted as sophisticated limited partners in activist hedge funds,
it is plausible that they have access to similar information about their target firms as their fund
managers. Furthermore, our results would be unchanged if investors did not observe η.
11Allowing for inflows of external capital or the reallocation of skin in the game, initial cash holdings,
or passive capital would bias the model in favor of competition for flow delivering higher engagement.
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fees and cash c if it did not engage—at its reinvestment rate of return Rθ. The fund’s
final payoff is therefore (φbP2 +wf
i
2 +cINE)Rθ, where INE is an indicator function that
is 1 if the fund does not engage, i.e., if a = NE.
For parsimony, we have abstracted from the fact that many funds, particularly
hedge funds, have more complex compensation structures that include, for example,
carried interest on delegated capital. Since the AUM fee parameter w only enters the
model as a t = 2 multiplier on the value of delegated capital, it can be interpreted as
including the expected value of carried interest as well as up front AUM fees.12
Socially optimal engagement
Engagement is a public good. In the subsequent analysis we analyze when engagement
is underprovided (or excessively provided) in equilibrium. In order to benchmark this
analysis, we first characterize the unconstrained socially optimal level of engagement.
For a given η, denote by Kη the smallest integer such that Kηb ≥ η (if it exists),
i.e., Kη ≡ argminx∈Nx satisfying xb ≥ η. Since Kη > N for any η > α, engagement
cannot succeed and should not occur for such η. At any given η ≤ α, engagement is
socially optimal if the cost of having exactly Kη skilled funds engage is less than the
benefits associated with successful engagement. Engagement by greater than Kη funds
is never optimal as this generates costs with no social benefits. In our equilibrium
analysis starting in Section 3, we refer to engagement by strictly more than Kη funds
in any equilibrium as excess engagement.
12For example, in our model if delegated capital with t = 2 value Z is allocated to a given fund
following the engagement game, they might earn a percentage AUM fee of ς on that value plus some
percentage % of the reinvestment gain, which is (Rθ − 1)Z. Then, we can think of w being set such
that wZ = ςZ + %(Rθ − 1)Z, i.e, w = ς + %(Rθ − 1). As an illustration, a traditional hedge fund with
a “two and twenty” fee structure offering an expected gross return of Rθ = 1.2 would then have a w
equal to .02 + .2(1.2− 1) = .06.
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The social payoffs from exactly Kη funds engaging at a given η include (i) the
reinvestment value of activist capital given successful engagement and potential real-
locations, (ii) the post-engagement value of capital held by passive shareholders, and
(iii) the investment of any cash not spent on engagement.
Consider (i) first. Let Υ ∈ [α, α + (1− φ) β] be the proportion of total firm value
held by skilled funds at t = 2 following any reallocation of capital. While social welfare
would always be improved by reallocating as much capital as possible to skilled funds,
we treat Υ as a parameter taking values over the indicated range in order to respect
the constraints on reallocation imposed in different parts of the equilibrium analysis
below. The lower bound of Υ reflects the fact that skilled funds already control an
α proportion of the firm, and social welfare cannot be improved by reallocating such
capital to unskilled funds. The upper bound of Υ reflects the fact that—as assumed in
the model—skin in the game cannot be reallocated; thus at most a (1− φ) β proportion
of total firm value can be reallocated to skilled funds. The post-engagement value of
activist capital given success is therefore Ph (ΥRS + (α + β −Υ)) for the relevant Υ.
As for (ii), since passive shareholders do not invest in activist funds, the post-
engagement value of capital held by such investors given success is Ph (1− α− β).
Finally, with respect to (iii), since the initial cash can only be reinvested at the rate of
return for the fund in question, the investment value of residual cash for a non-engaging
fund is cRθ.
The total welfare enjoyed by all shareholders if Kη skilled funds engage is therefore
Ph(ΥRS+(1−Υ))+(N−Kη)cRS+Mc. Alternatively, social welfare with no engagement
equals Mc+NcRS. This proves the following result.
Proposition 1. The social optimum for a given Υ is characterized as follows: (1) for
every η ≤ α, if c ≤ Ph(ΥRS+(1−Υ))
KηRS
, exactly Kη skilled funds engage and engagement
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succeeds, while if c > Ph(ΥRS+(1−Υ))
KηRS
there is no engagement, (2) for every η > α, there
is no engagement.
3 Engagement in equilibrium
As discussed above, activism is a public good which may be underprovided in a de-
centralized equilibrium. Public goods provision problems are usually characterized by
multiplicity of equilibria. As a result, the full equilibrium set of our game is com-
plex. Since our interest is in examining when engagement across multiple blockholders
may succeed in equilibrium, we characterize equilibria with “maximal success” for a
given set of parameters, i.e., equilibria with the highest overall probability of successful
engagement.13 Such equilibria maximize the expected terminal value of the firm.
Since only skilled funds can engage, our game simplifies into a sequence of state-
contingent subgames, one for each η, at which the skilled funds choose their actions.
Maximal success equilibria are, therefore, equivalent to the following:
Definition 1. A maximal success equilibrium is one in which for each η, the probability
of successful engagement is maximal.
While our interest is in characterizing maximal success equilibria, we begin with
the observation that there is always a free-riding equilibrium with no engagement. All
proofs are in Online Appendix A.
Lemma 1. There exists an equilibrium with no engagement.
If no activist engages, no individual activist can unilaterally change the engagement
outcome (because η > b). Furthermore, since Pl = 0 attracting additional delegated
13Our interest in analyzing the maximal scope for successful engagement also explains why we do
not instead focus on symmetric mixed strategy equilibria, which generate a lower success probability.
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capital is worthless. As a result, there are no benefits to engagement, and costly
engagement never occurs.
3.1 Proprietary blocks
We start our characterization of maximal success equilibria by considering a proprietary
blocks benchmark that corresponds to most of the existing literature on blockholder
governance.14 In this benchmark, φ = 1 so that funds manage only their own money,
and competition for flow and delegation fees are irrelevant. We begin with a definition.
Definition 2. For a given η, a pure strategy profile in which Kη skilled funds engage
is a Kη profile.
We next show that Kη profiles form the basis for successful engagement within a
maximal success equilibrium.
Proposition 2. In the proprietary blocks game, a maximal success equilibrium is char-
acterized as follows: (1) for every η ≤ α, if c ≤ bPh then a Kη profile is played and
engagement succeeds, while if c > bPh there is no engagement, (2) for every η > α,
there is no engagement.
When η > α, engagement involving only skilled funds cannot succeed, so the only
scope for success is when η ≤ α. For such η, the result shows that the maximal success
equilibrium involves engagement by exactly the number of blockholders required for
success. Since each fund cares only about the impact of engagement on the value of her
individual block, she will engage if and only if she believes she is pivotal with respect to
14Our comparison below between the proprietary and delegated environments holds the ownership
structure, including individual block sizes, constant. In reality, ownership structure may be endoge-
nous to the nature of blockholders.
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engagement success, and moreover will be willing to forego the benefits of saving c to
invest at t = 2 only if her individual net payoff from engagement conditional on being
pivotal, bPhRS, is sufficiently large. The relevant condition for engagement is therefore
cRS ≤ bPhRS, i.e., c ≤ bPh as stated in the result. When the cost of engagement is
higher, the only possible equilibrium outcome is free-riding.15
We now compare this equilibrium to the social optimum derived above, specifying
Υ = α to reflect the restrictions of the model with proprietary blocks, i.e., the absence of
any capital reallocation. The social optimum has two key features: (1) a constraint on
the number of engaging activists to Kη whenever engagement occurs (to avoid excessive
deadweight costs) and (2) a range of costs over which such engagement is optimal. The
decentralized equilibrium in Proposition 2 delivers one of these characteristics: since
funds will not engage unless they believe they are pivotal, there is never engagement
by more than Kη funds. However, because each activist cares only about the value of
her individual stake, her incentive to engage is strictly lower than society would prefer.
In particular, as we have shown above, society desires sufficient skilled engagement
to achieve success at every η ≤ α whenever c ≤ Ph(ΥRS+(1−Υ))
KηRS
. Given Υ = α and




16 Thus, we state without
proof:
Corollary 1. In the maximal success equilibrium of the proprietary blocks game:
1. Successful engagement arises for a strictly smaller range of parameters in equi-
librium than in the social optimum, i.e., engagement is underprovided.
2. There is no excess engagement.





different Kη profiles that deliver identical engagement
outcomes for that η. We do not distinguish across such subgame equilibria.
16The latter inequality would clearly also hold for any Υ > α.
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3.2 Delegation without competition for flow
Delegated blockholders differ in two key ways from proprietary blockholders in our
model: (1) they have less “skin in the game” (φ < 1) since some of their capital comes
from outside investors, and (2) they have an incentive to attract additional outside
capital due to their fees, i.e., they compete for flow. To isolate the effects of these
two factors on engagement incentives, we start by considering a version of the model
in which blocks are owned by funds using a combination of proprietary and delegated
capital but there are no flows, so only the first difference is operable. This allows us to
illustrate the “standard” intuition that delegation reduces incentives since funds who
have less skin in the game face lower incentives to take privately costly actions that
benefit all investors.
Proposition 3. In the delegated game without competition for flow, a maximal success
equilibrium is characterized as follows: (1) for every η ≤ α, if c ≤ φbPh +w(1− φ)bPh
then a Kη profile is played and engagement succeeds, while if c > φbPh + w(1− φ)bPh
there is no engagement, (2) for every η > α, there is no engagement.
Intuitively, the first term on the right hand side of the upper boundary on c, φbPh, is
similar to the analogous condition in Proposition 2 and reflects incentives coming from
pivotality. This incentive is lower than in the proprietary case because φ < 1, reflecting
lower incentives to engage with less skin in the game. The second term on the right
hand side reflects incentives coming from fees on locked-up delegated capital. These
fees are maximized when the firm’s value is maximized. Despite this, given w < 1
the right hand side of the existence condition in Proposition 3 is clearly less than the
right hand side of the existence condition in Proposition 2. Intuitively, while fees on
delegated capital offset the reduction in returns on proprietary capital, the offsetting
17
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2529230
is not complete because the fee rate on delegated capital, w, is less than 1. Thus, the
scope for successful equilibrium engagement is reduced compared to the proprietary
blocks game, and more so the lower are φ and w. However, at any given η no more
than Kη funds engage as in the proprietary case. Thus:
Corollary 2. In the maximal success equilibrium of the delegated game without com-
petition for flow:
1. Successful engagement arises for a strictly smaller range of parameters in equi-
librium than in the proprietary blocks game, i.e., the underprovision problem is
exacerbated.
2. There is no excess engagement.
3.3 Delegation with competition for flow
In this section we provide our main results on equilibria with competition for flow.
First, we lay out some further definitions.
Definition 3. For a given η and any Lη ∈ {Kη + 1, ..., N − 1}, a pure strategy profile
in which Lη skilled funds engage is an Lη profile.





(1− φ) bPh +
1
x
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Intuitively, ĉ(x) represents the fees that each engaging fund earns as a result of
capital flows in a situation where exactly x funds engage and those funds are assigned
a higher posterior belief by investors than the M+N−x non-engaging funds. The total
reallocatable capital in each fund is (1 − φ)b. Each engaging fund retains their own
reallocatable capital and receives inflows worth 1/x times the total capital reallocated
from non-engaging funds. Such fees are then reinvestable at rate RS for a total flow
reward of ĉ(x)RS. Note that ĉ(x) is strictly decreasing in x.
Given the complexity of the full model, we split our analysis of maximal engagement
equilibria into two results. First, we derive the existence of relevant subgame equilibria
at each η.
Lemma 2. In the delegated game with competition for flow, for any η ≤ α:
1. When η ≤ (N − 1)b,
(a) if c ∈ (ĉ(Kη + 1), φbPh + ĉ(Kη)] a subgame equilibrium exists in which a Kη
profile is played, or
(b) if c ∈ (ĉ(Lη + 1), ĉ(Lη)] a subgame equilibrium exists in which an Lη profile
is played, for Lη ∈ {Kη + 1, ..., N − 1} , or
(c) if c < ĉ(N) a subgame equilibrium exists in which an N profile is played.
2. When η ∈ ((N−1)b, α], if c ≤ φbPh+ ĉ(N) a subgame equilibrium exists in which
an N profile is played.
It is noteworthy that the ranges of c over which the equilibria with different strategy
profiles (i.e., Kη, Lη and N profiles) exist are non-overlapping, i.e., only one such profile
can be played at a given c. We next show that the subgame equilibria derived above
are part of a maximal success equilibrium.
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Proposition 4. In the delegated game with competition for flow, a maximal success
equilibrium is characterized as follows: (1) for every η ≤ α, if c ≤ φbPh + ĉ(Kη) a Kη,
Lη, or N profile is played and engagement succeeds, while if c > φbPh + ĉ(Kη) there is
no engagement, (2) for every η > α there is no engagement.
This result is similar to Propositions 2 and 3 in that successful engagement only
occurs if η ≤ α, but note that the condition on c in part (1) of the proposition de-
pends on Kη, and therefore on η, whereas in Propositions 2 and 3 the condition was
independent of η. Thus, in the benchmark games engagement is “all or nothing” for
all η’s below α: either there is successful engagement for all such η, or for none of
them. In the delegated game with competition for flow, however, there can be different
engagement outcomes at different η’s depending on the exact value of c.
It is important to note that our characterization of maximal success equilibria is
not limited to pure strategy equilibria, even though those are the only equilibria that
appear in our results. For c ≤ φbPh + ĉ(Kη), the identified pure strategy equilibria
deliver success for certain, which no mixed equilibrium could do, so must constitute the
maximal success subgames. Furthermore, in the proofs we show that mixed strategy
equilibria with positive probability of engagement cannot arise at c′s above the upper
limits in the proposition, so there is no way to achieve success with positive probability
at those c′s.
To see why this is true, it is useful to compare incentives to engage between the Kη
subgame equilibrium and a potential mixed equilibrium. Such incentives may differ
in two possible ways. First, in mixed equilibria, funds are pivotal only with positive
probability, while in Kη subgame equilibria each engaging fund is pivotal for sure. Since
pivotality increases incentives to engage, mixed equilibria must feature lower incentives
to engage on the basis of pure monetary rewards. Second, in contrast to Kη subgame
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equilibria, the number of engaging funds in any mixed equilibrium can be either higher
than Kη (in which case the flow rewards are smaller than in a Kη subgame equilibrium),
or lower than Kη (in which case engagement will fail and capital is worthless). In either
case, the flow incentives to engage are lower in the mixed equilibrium than in the Kη
equilibrium. Thus, for any c for which the Kη subgame equilibrium cannot exist, mixed
equilibria also cannot exist.
We can also state several comparative statics.
Proposition 5. The following statements hold in the the maximal success equilibrium
identified in Proposition 4:
1. For any η ≤ α, the highest c for which engagement occurs in equilibrium is
weakly decreasing in η.
2. For any given c, there exists a threshold level of η, η̄ ≤ α, such that in the
equilibrium engagement occurs iff η ≤ η̄.
3. For any given c, the number of funds engaging in equilibrium is weakly increasing
in η as long as η is below the threshold for engagement to occur.
The first result is straightforward: for larger η a greater number of funds must
engage to achieve success, which means smaller flow rewards to each engaging fund
and therefore a smaller range of c for which success can be achieved. The second result
is essentially a corollary to the first: since it is harder to sustain engagement at higher
η, for a given c there will exist some maximum η at which success can be achieved.
The third result reflects the fact that, for a given c, as η increases the number of funds
required for success (Kη) increases. Thus, as long as a Kη subgame equilibrium can
still be supported, the number of equilibrium engagers will weakly increase.
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4 The Role of Competition for Flow
The key difference between the full model analyzed in Section 3.3 and the benchmarks
analyzed in Section 3.1 and 3.2 is that funds compete for flow. We now analyze the
manner in which competition for flow affects incentives to engage, and subsequently
highlight two key implications of such incentives and analyze their welfare implications.
We first show that with competition for flow the aggregate amount of activist
capital, α + β, has a key effect on engagement incentives.
Proposition 6. A change in α + β holding b constant affects a fund’s incentive to
engage only in the delegated game with competition for flow. In that game, increasing
α + β increases the fund’s incentive to engage.
In the proprietary blocks game, a given fund’s incentive to engage is limited to the
impact on her own capital; she is indifferent to the effect on other shareholders. The
amount of total activist capital is therefore irrelevant to her incentives, and engagement
is underprovided. As one may suspect on the basis of standard agency theory, this
problem is exacerbated in the delegated game without competition for flow since the
fund’s effective block size is reduced from b to b (φ+ w(1− φ)) < b. However, in the
delegated game with competition for flow, a fund’s incentive to engage depends on how
much capital is available in the economy for her to attract if she can advertise her skill.
Thus competition for flow fundamentally alters the incentives for engagement: When
funds compete for flow, the total size of activist capital is relevant to their incentives.
There are two interrelated ways in which changes in activist capital affects engage-
ment incentives. A change in the availability of unskilled activist capital, β, affects
engagement incentives only along the intensive margin: for each η ≤ α at which
engagement occurs, an increase in β causes the upper limit of c (as identified in Propo-
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sition 4) to rise (ĉ(Kη) is increasing in β), since the amount of capital to attract from
“unskilled” funds expands. An increase in the availability of skilled capital, α, on the
other hand affects both the intensive and extensive margins: apart from a symmetric
increase in the range of c over which engagement occurs (as in the case of an increase
in β), it also increases the range of η over which success can be achieved, i.e., there are
some η for which engagement may now occur but for which engagement was infeasible
before.
At a deeper level, the reason that the total amount of activist capital affects incen-
tives is that, unlike price appreciation, flow rewards from successful engagement are
excludable benefits: funds that expend the cost of engagement advertise their skill and
thus gain capital flows that do not accrue to non-engaging funds. We show that such
endogenously generated excludable benefits have a dual effect. On the one hand, they
can ameliorate the underprovision of engagement identified in Sections 3.1 and 3.2. On
the other hand, they can lead to excess engagement, as funds engage even when their
engagement is unnecessary in order to attract flow. We examine each of these in turn.
4.1 Competition for flow ameliorates underengagement
The potential to attract flow by advertising skill incentivizes engagement. We can see
this by comparing engagement in the full model with that in our two benchmarks.
Proposition 7. In the maximal success equilibrium of the delegated game with com-
petition for flow:
1. For each η ≤ α, if c ∈ (φbPh + w(1− φ)bPh, φbPh + ĉ(Kη)] engagement succeeds
where success is impossible in the delegated game without competition for flow.
Furthermore, this range is always non-empty.
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2. For each η ≤ α, if c ∈ (bPh, φbPh + ĉ(Kη)] engagement succeeds where success
is impossible in the proprietary blocks game. Furthermore, if M + N > 2
w
, this
range is non-empty for some η.
Part (1) of Proposition 7 compares the delegated games with and without com-
petition for flow. The potential for attracting flow enhances rewards for engagement,
raising incentives to engage in the game with competition for flow. This results in
successful engagement over a larger parameter space. The comparison in Part (2),
with respect to the proprietary game, is more subtle. Here, the increased incentive to
engage due to competition for flow must compete with the lowered incentive to engage
due to reduced skin in the game (relative to the proprietary game). Nevertheless, we
show that under certain conditions, there is a range of c over which the positive effect
of competition for flow dominates the negative effect of reduced skin in the game for
some η. This occurs when the number of activist blocks is sufficiently large. Fixing
the pool of activist capital, α + β, the smaller is block size, b, the more likely it is
that this condition will be satisfied. This is because while a smaller block size directly
discourages engagement in the proprietary case, the relative per-blockholder gains from
potential flow increase as blocks get smaller.
The aggregation across the incentive effects of competition for flow and reduced
skin in the game is fundamentally a quantitative issue, and our model is not ideally
suited to such quantitative comparisons. For example, in our model we have taken the
conservative view that only delegated capital invested in the single firm at issue can be
reallocated based on the engagement outcome. In reality, capital may flow to skilled
funds from investments outside this particular firm. Thus, it is conceivable that the
quantitative effect of competition for flow is in reality greater than what is captured
by the model.
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4.2 Competition for flow leads to excess engagement
Inspection of Lemma 2 indicates that for any η ≤ (N − 1)b, if c < ĉ(Kη + 1) a
subgame equilibrium exists in which Kη +1 or more funds engage in equilibrium. Such
engagement is non-pivotal or excess engagement, which never occured in the previous
benchmark models (see Corollaries 1 and 2), but now occurs in equilibrium anywhere
an Lη or N profile is played. Thus, we can state:
Corollary 3. Excess engagement arises in maximal success equilibria if and only if
funds compete for flow. For any η ≤ (N−1)b, excess engagement occurs in the maximal
success equilibrium of the delegated game with competition for flow if c < ĉ(Kη + 1).
This is a result of the fact that capital inflows are an excludable benefit, and thus
funds may wish to engage in equilibrium even if their engagement is not essential for
success. This also explains why there are lower as well as upper bounds on the range
of permissible costs in parts (a) and (b) of Lemma 2: the lower bounds ensure that
only the prescribed number of funds engage.
We now provide further insight into the ranges of c and η over which excess en-
gagement arises in equilibrium. In Figure 1 we map the different maximal success
subgame equilibria identified in Lemma 2 for varying levels of η and c, focusing on the
range of η for which Kη is between N − 3 and N . For purposes of the figure we define
π ≡ φbPh. Each vertical line corresponds to a break-point where Kη increases in steps
as η increases to the right. The empty regions above the upper red lines within each
vertical band correspond to the part of the parameter space where there is no engage-
ment because c is too high. For c′s below the red line, an equilibrium with successful
engagement exists. For the highest range of c′s within each band below the red line,
the equilibrium involves a Kη profile being played, i.e., only the required number of
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Figure 1: The figure illustrates the number of engaging skilled funds in the maximal
success equilibrium for different values of η and c.
skilled funds engage and they are all pivotal. For ranges of c below the blue lines,
maximal success equilibria involve engagement by more than the required number of
skilled funds (i.e., involve an Lη or N profile being played), and thus feature excess
engagement.
4.3 Competition for flow can be beneficial or harmful
Delegation with competition for flow can ameliorate the underprovision of engagement
in equilibrium and allow for valuable reallocation of capital, but at the expense of
fostering the possibility of excess engagement. Thus, deriving general results about
the overall welfare effect is complex. However, we are able to identify two ranges of
engagement costs over which the welfare effect of delegation with competition for flow
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is unambiguous.
Proposition 8. In maximal success equilibria:
1. For each η ≤ α, whenever c ∈ (max {bPh, ĉ(Kη + 1)} , φbPh + ĉ(Kη)] delegation
with competition for flow increases social welfare relative to the proprietary blocks
game.
2. For each η ≤ (N − 1)b, whenever c ≤ min {bPh, ĉ(Kη + 1)} delegation with
competition for flow decreases social welfare relative to the proprietary blocks
game as long as RS is sufficiently low.
Over the range of costs in part (1), engagement does not arise in the proprietary
blocks game (because c > bPh) but does arise in the delegated game with competition
for flow (because c ≤ φbPh + ĉ(Kη)). Furthermore, the number of engaging funds in
the delegated game with competition for flow is Kη, i.e., there is no excess engagement
(because c > ĉ(Kη+1)). Finally, we show in the proof that φbPh+ĉ(Kη) is always lower
than the relevant socially optimal engagement cost threshold, and hence engagement
at such c′s is efficient. Thus, delegation with competition for flow is unambiguously
beneficial in this cost range.
Over the range of costs in part (2), engagement arises in both the proprietary
blocks game (because c ≤ bPh) and delegated game with competition for flow (because
c ≤ ĉ(Kη + 1)). However, there is excess engagement in the delegated game: for
η ≤ (N−1)b, we haveKη < N , so the Lη orN equilibrium that arises with c ≤ ĉ(Kη+1)
represents excess engagement. This has a negative welfare effect. However, there is
an offsetting positive effect due to the reallocation of capital from unskilled to skilled
funds that is not possible in the proprietary blocks game. For sufficiently low values
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of RS, the negative effect is guaranteed to outweigh the positive effect, resulting in an
overall welfare loss.
Overall, this result implies that delegation is more likely to be beneficial for high
cost forms of engagement. As discussed in the introduction, these are the situations
most likely to be relevant for hedge fund activism.
5 Discussion
In this section we discuss some of our modeling assumptions and compare our model’s
implications to other possible explanations of wolf packs.
5.1 Other models of wolf packs
It is clear that there may be alternative models of wolf pack formation. For example,
one may conjecture that wolf packs arise as a result of private benefits available to each
wolf pack member or because of tacit collusion across multiple activist campaigns over
time by groups of hedge funds. However, our mechanism generates unique implications
that may help separate our findings from these and other alternative explanations.
In our model, funds have the ability to attract capital from other activist funds by
advertising their skill. They do so by selectively engaging only when their information
indicates that doing so is appropriate. This renders the total size of activist capital
relevant to their engagement incentives. The larger is the pool of total activist capital,
the higher is the proportionate amount that each fund can attract by advertising their
skill. This distinguishes our predictions from a number of alternative explanations
of wolf pack formation. For example, it may be natural to associate the growth of
reallocatable capital in the model with the size of the total activist industry (e.g., if
28
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2529230
our target firm is “representative”). If so, our model predicts that wolf packs would be
seen mostly when the industry has grown and matured, so that a significant pool of
reallocatable activist capital is available to successful activists. This stands in contrast
with both tacit collusion or private benefit models of wolf pack activism. It is arguable
that tacit collusion across multiple targets is harder to sustain in an industry with a
larger number of activists. Similarly, it is unclear that private benefits scale with the
size of the activist industry. Finally, our framework shows that it is precisely when
blocks are relatively small that the positive effect of competition for flow is most likely
to overcome the negative effect of reduced skin in the game. It is not obvious that
other theories of wolf pack formation, including tacit collusion and private benefits,
generate such an implication.
5.2 Single blockholder engagements and hidden wolf packs
As discussed above, for data-driven reasons the empirical literature has focused on
blockholders who cross the relevant reporting thresholds (5% ownership in the US),
and thus may undercount wolf packs involving smaller blockholders. In other words,
activist campaigns identified in the empirical literature as single-blockholder engage-
ments may involve “hidden” wolf packs.17 However, it is noteworthy that our model
of flow motivation could, in principle, apply to single blockholder engagements as well.
Formally, this would be captured in our model by setting the lower bound of η below
b, so that a single blockholder sometimes has effective control. In practice this could
mean that either management in these cases sees the benefits of the activist’s agenda
17Hidden wolf packs could also arise if a single activist hedge fund receives implicit support from
other types of institutional investors, including, e.g., flow motivated mutual funds. An earlier version
of this paper (Brav et al. 2019) explored such a model. Evidence for such support across different
types of institutional investors can be found in Kedia et al. (2021).
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and is easily persuaded to capitulate, or non-activist shareholders representing a signif-
icant proportional ownership stake can be persuaded by the activist to provide passive
voting support. Our analysis in the bulk of this paper could therefore be viewed as
capturing situations in which neither of these things are true, i.e., where management
is not interested in yielding and/or there are not sufficient persuadable shareholders to
allow a single activist blockholder to prevail. Such difficult targets may emerge when
the activism industry is large or mature and easy targets are in short supply. Inter-
estingly, even in such cases where a single activist may prevail, our characterization of
excess engagement suggests that one may still see wolfpacks.
5.3 Non-zero Pl
Throughout the paper we have maintained the assumption that Pl = 0. However, this
is not required for our qualitative results. If Pl > 0, it is straightforward to show for
both the proprietary game and the delegated game without competition for flow that
engagement incentives are dampened for all players (because the difference in firm value
based on the engagement outcome is smaller), and that the social optimum involves
less engagement. Thus, the maximal success equilibria in these games are qualitatively
unchanged. In the delegated game with competition for flow, a sufficiently high Pl
may affect incentives in perverse ways because skilled funds may wish to engage even
when they know success is impossible in order to protect their delegated capital. A





. When this condition
is satisfied, the maximal success equilibria in the delegated game with reallocation will
be qualitatively similar to those analyzed in Proposition 4, with the proviso that we
can no longer definitively rule out mixed strategy equilibria with some probability of
success at higher c′s.
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6 Conclusion
The possibility of collective engagement by non-controlling blockholders has important
implications for corporate governance. We show that parallel engagement by institu-
tional blockholders can play a powerful role in activist campaigns, thus providing a
lens through which to view activist wolf packs, a tactic that has generated significant
attention. In doing so we analyze the key role of delegation in determining the level
of engagment across non-controlling blockholders. Our analysis highlights two key dif-
ferences between delegated and non-delegated blockholders: reduced skin in the game,
and competition for investor flow. We show that while reduced skin in the game weak-
ens engagement incentives, competition for flow fosters an endogenous set of transfers
across funds that strengthens incentives to engage, though it can also foster incentives
to engage excessively. As Franklin Allen emphasized in his AFA Presidential Address
(Allen, 2001), the incentives faced by institutional money managers can have a signif-
icant impact on financial markets. Our study suggests that these incentives can have
even wider-ranging implications, for example by affecting the nature of shareholder
activism.
Our results shed light on existing empirical results regarding wolfpacks, and its new
testable predictions should enable empirical researchers to better study the mechanics
and implications of collective shareholder engagement. Future work could also examine
the role that explicit collusion or intentional information leakage might play in either
substituting for or complementing the mechanism we model.
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Online Appendix for “Wolf Pack Activism”
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Online Appendix A: Omitted proofs
Additional notation. In the proofs below, wherever relevant, we index the N skilled
activist funds by i ∈ {1, 2, ...N}. Investors cannot observe the indices of individ-
ual funds, because otherwise fund’s types would become publicly known. We denote
strategies by σi : η → {E,NE}.
Proof of Lemma 1: In equilibrium, P2 = 0. Since η ∈ (b, 1], unilateral engagement
by any deviator cannot change P2, and thus the payoff to engagement is 0 while the
payoff to not engaging is cRS.
Proof of Proposition 2: First, we show that, for every η ≤ α, if c ≤ bPh a subgame
equilibrium exists in which a Kη profile is played. For each such η, let us specify a
strategy profile in which σi(η) = E if and only if i ∈ εKη where εKη is a subset of
{1, 2, ...N} with cardinality Kη. Given such a strategy profile, for each i ∈ εKη , the
payoff to engaging is bPhRS, while the payoff to not engaging is cRS, since engagement
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fails if less than Kη funds engage. For each i /∈ εKη , the payoff to engaging is bPhRS,
while the payoff to not engaging is bPhRS + cRS, since engagement succeeds even
without the fund’s own engagement since Kη funds are already engaging in equilibrium.
Hence, for c ≤ bPh, it is a best response for all i ∈ εKη to engage, and for all i /∈ εKη
not to engage.
Next, note that these subgame equilibria achieve successful engagement for sure for
all η ≤ α, and so characterize a maximal success equilibrium for c ≤ bPh at those η.
Holding η ≤ α, suppose instead that c > bPh. Now, for any i ∈ {1, ..., N}, the maximal
payoff to engaging would be bPhRS, whereas the minimal payoff to not engaging would
be cRS. Therefore it is a dominant strategy not to engage. Hence, for all η > α, we
have P2 = 0, regardless of σi(η) for i = 1, ..., N . Therefore it is a dominant strategy
for each skilled activist to not engage. 
Proof of Proposition 3: First, we show that, for every η ≤ α, if c ≤ φbPh + w(1−
φ)bPh a subgame equilibrium exists in which a Kη profile is played. For each such η,
let us specify a strategy profile in which σi(η) = E if and only if i ∈ εKη where εKη
is a subset of {1, 2, ...N} with cardinality Kη. Given such a strategy profile, for each
i ∈ εKη , the payoff to engaging is φbPhRS + wRS(1 − φ)bPh, while the payoff to not
engaging is cRS, since engagement fails if less than Kη funds engage, rendering the value
of both proprietary and delegated capital zero. For each i /∈ εKη , the payoff to engaging
is φbPhRS + wRS(1 − φ)bPh, while the payoff to not engaging is φbPhRS + wRS(1 −
φ)bPh+cRS, since engagement succeeds even without the fund’s own engagement since
Kη funds are already engaging in equilibrium. Hence, for c ≤ φbPh + w(1 − φ)bPh, it
is a best response for all i ∈ εKη to engage, and for all i /∈ εKη not to engage.
Next, note that these subgame equilibria achieve successful engagement for sure for
all η ≤ α, and so characterize a maximal success equilibrium for c ≤ φbPh+w(1−φ)bPh
2
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at those η. Holding η ≤ α, suppose instead that c > φbPh+w(1−φ)bPh. Now, for any
i ∈ {1, ..., N}, the maximal payoff to engaging would be φbRSPh+wRS(1−φ)bPh < 0,
whereas the minimal payoff to not engaging would be cRS. Therefore it is a dominant
strategy not to engage. Hence, for all η > α, we have P2 = 0, regardless of σi(η) for
i = 1, ..., N . Therefore it is a dominant strategy for each skilled fund to not engage. 
Proof of Lemma 2: We begin by specifying off equilibrium beliefs that are used
to support the equilibria that we construct. Investors who evaluate funds base their
inferences on each fund’s enagement and the publicly observed value of η. When they
observe an off-equilibrium amount of engagement at a given η, we assume that that all
engagers are assigned a posterior of 1, while all non-engagers are assigned a posterior
strictly less than 1.
Suppose η ≤ (N−1)b. For each such η, let us first specify a strategy profile in which
σi(η) = E if and only if i ∈ εKη where εKη is a subset of {1, 2, ...N} with cardinality
Kη. Given such a strategy profile, for each i ∈ εKη , the payoff to engaging is
φbRSPh + wRS
(
(1− φ) bPh +
1
Kη
(M +N −Kη)b(1− φ)Ph
)
,
where the payoffs follow from the facts that: (i) if that fund engages engagement
succeeds (each fund is pivotal); (ii) engagement reveals the fund to be skilled (because
only skilled funds engage in equilibrium), and thus the fund retains its own delegated
capital and further gains a 1/Kη-th share of the capital of the M +N −Kη funds that
do not engage. In contrast, the payoff to not engaging is cRS, because engagement
fails if less than Kη funds engage so any remaining proprietary or delegated capital is
3
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worthless. Thus, for each i ∈ εKη , engagement is a best response if:
c ≤ φbPh + w
(
(1− φ) bPh +
1
Kη
(M +N −Kη)b(1− φ)Ph
)
= φbPh + ĉ(Kη).
For each i /∈ εKη , the equilibrium payoff to not engaging is φbPhRS + cRS, because (as
above) all delegated capital is transferred to funds that have i ∈ εKη . If they deviate






(M +N −Kη − 1)b(1− φ)Ph
)
,
because with more than Kη engagers engagement succeeds, and all Kη + 1 engagers
are considered skilled and capture delegated capital from the M +N − (Kη + 1) non-






(M +N −Kη − 1)b(1− φ)Ph
)
= ĉ(Kη + 1).
Thus, a Kη profile is a subgame equilibrium if c ∈ (ĉ(Kη + 1), φbPh + ĉ(Kη)].
Next, consider c ≤ ĉ(Kη +1). For any Lη ∈ {Kη + 1, ..., N − 1} , let us next specify
a strategy profile in which σi(η) = E if and only if i ∈ εLη where εLη is a subset of
{1, 2, ...N} with cardinality Lη. Given such a strategy profile, for each i ∈ εLη , the
payoff to engaging is
φbRSPh + wRS
(
(1− φ) bPh +
1
Lη
(M +N − Lη)b(1− φ)Ph
)
,
where the payoffs follow from the facts that: (i) if that fund engages engagement
succeeds (more than Kη funds are engaging); (ii) engagement reveals the fund to be
4
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skilled (because only skilled funds engage in equilibrium), and thus the fund retains its
own delegated capital and further gains a 1/Lη-th share of the capital of the M+N−Lη
funds that do not engage. In contrast, the payoff to not engaging is φbRSPh + cRS,
because engagement still succeeds without that fund’s participation (no individual fund
is pivotal for Lη > Kη) but non-engagement leads to an outflow of all delegated capital,
consistent with our assumed off-equilibrium beliefs. Thus, for each i ∈ εLη , engagement
is a best response if:
c ≤ w
(
(1− φ) bPh +
1
Lη
(M +N − Lη)b(1− φ)Ph
)
= ĉ(Lη).
For each i /∈ εLη , the equilibrium payoff to not engaging is φbPhRS + cRS, because (as
above) all delegated capital is transferred to funds that have i ∈ εLη . If they deviate






(M +N − Lη − 1)b(1− φ)Ph
)
,
because with more than Lη engagers engagement succeeds, and all Lη + 1 engagers are
considered skilled and capture delegated capital from theM+N−(Lη+1) non-engagers.






(M +N − Lη − 1)b(1− φ)Ph
)
= ĉ(Lη + 1).
Thus, a Lη profile is a subgame equilibrium if c ∈ (ĉ(Lη + 1), ĉ(Lη)].
Since ĉ(Lη) is strictly decreasing in Lη, the ranges of c for which the Lη subgame
equilibria exist do not overlap for different Lη. So, now consider the case where c ≤
ĉ(N). Now let us next specify a strategy profile in which σi(η) = E if and only if
5
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i ∈ {1, 2, ...N}. Given such a strategy profile, for each i, the payoff to engaging is
φbRSPh + wRS
(






where the payoffs follow from the facts that: (i) if that fund engages engagement
succeeds (each fund is pivotal); (ii) engagement reveals the fund to be skilled (because
only skilled funds engage in equilibrium), and thus the fund retains its own delegated
capital and further gains a 1/N -th share of the capital of the M funds that do not
engage. In contrast, the payoff to not engaging is φbRSPh + cRS, because engagement
still succeeds without that fund’s participation (no individual fund is pivotal for N >
Kη) but non-engagement leads to an outflow of all delegated capital, consistent with
our off-equilibrium beliefs. Thus, for each i, engagement is a best response if:
c ≤ w
(






Finally, for η ∈ ((N −1)b, α] we have Kη = N . Thus, by repetition of the argument for
Kη subgame equilibria above, we have that if c ≤ φbPh + ĉ(N) a subgame equilibrium
exists in which an N profile is played. Note that we do not need to compute a lower
bound on c because all skilled funds engage in this subgame equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 4: For c ≤ φbPh + ĉ(Kη) the specified equilibrium strategies
achieve successful engagement for sure for all η ≤ α, and so we have characterized a
maximal success equilibrium for such parameters. For η > α, engagement can never
succeed, so any reallocatable capital is worthless and it is a dominant strategy not to
engage. Thus, to prove the result we need to show that for η ≤ α and c > φbPh+ ĉ(Kη)
skilled funds never engage. Holding η ≤ α, suppose that c > φbPh + ĉ(Kη). We
6
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first show that for such c, there is never any pure strategy subgame equilibrium with
successful engagement. Successful engagement requires that, at each η, at least Kη
funds engage. Thus, the only possible pure strategy subgame equilibria are ones in
which, for η ≤ (N − 1)b, Kη, Lη,or N profiles are played at each η while for η ∈
((N − 1)b, α] an N profile is played at each η. To demonstrate the non-existence of
each such pure strategy subgame equilibrium, we shall show that the upper bound on
c was not only sufficient, but also necessary, to ensure that funds due to engage in
equilibrium do not deviate to non-engagement. This may, in principle, depend on off
equilibrium beliefs.
In a Kη subgame equilibrium, the deviation of any fund to non-engagement leads
to failure, in which case all capital, proprietary and delegated, is worthless and thus
the deviation payoff is unaffected by flows driven by off equilibrium investor beliefs.
For Lη or N subgame equilibria, the incentive to deviate to non-engagement for such
agents relies on off-equilibrium inferences about such agents.
We shall show that the off-equilibrium beliefs used to construct the equilibria in
Lemma 2 already imposed maximal penalties for deviation to non-engagement. In
other words, any other off equilibrium belief would strictly reduce incentives to engage.
Hence, if engaging funds would wish to deviate under the off equilibrium beliefs of
Lemma 2, they would certainly wish to do so for any other off equilibrium beliefs.
The off equilibrium beliefs that were used to support the subgame equilibria in
Lemma 2 are as follows. Investors who evaluate funds base their inferences on each
fund’s enagement and the publicly observed value of η. When they observe an off-
equilibrium amount of engagement at a given η, we assume that that all engagers are
assigned a posterior of 1, while all non-engagers are assigned a posterior strictly less
than 1.
7
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These beliefs imply that in any Lη or N subgame equilibrium, if a fund deviates
to non-engagement then investors observe a strictly smaller number of engagers than
specified and the deviating fund is assigned a posterior strictly smaller than 1, meaning
that it loses all delegated capital to funds that do engage. This is clearly the maximal
punishment that can be imposed on the deviating fund subject to engagement being
successful.
Consider η ≤ (N − 1)b. Suppose that a Kη profile is played in equilibrium. In
other words, for each such η, let us first specify a strategy profile in which σi(η) = E if
and only if i ∈ εKη where εKη is a subset of {1, 2, ...N} with cardinality Kη. For each
i ∈ εKη , the payoff to engaging is φbRSPh +RS ĉ(Kη),while the payoff to not engaging
is cRS. Thus, for c > φbPh + ĉ(Kη), player i will deviate for any i ∈ εKη . So the Kη
profile cannot be played in equilibrium.
Now, considering Lη profiles instead, it is clear from the proof of Lemma 2 that
for any player due to engage in such a subgame equilibrium, it is necessary to have
c < ĉ(Lη) < ĉ(Kη) < φbPh+ ĉ(Kη). Hence, Lη profiles cannot be played in equilibrium.
Similarly, for N equilibria for each skilled fund, it is necessary to have c < ĉ(N) <
ĉ(Kη) < φbPh + ĉ(Kη). Hence, N profiles cannot be played in equilibrium. The
argument for N profiles for η ∈ ((N − 1)b, α] is identical to the proof for Kη profiles,
since for η ∈ ((N − 1)b, α], Kη = N .
To complete the proof, we now need to show that for c > φbPh + ĉ(Kη), there are
no equilibria where skilled funds mix. Suppose skilled funds engage with some index-
dependent probability σi. Since only skilled funds mix, engagement is a positive signal,
regardless of success. For any skilled fund the payoff from engagement is as follows
Πmixedengage ≡ φbE(P2|engage)RS
8









(M +N − j)
)
P2 (j) b
where P2(j) is the terminal price of the target firm when j funds engage. The payoff
to not engaging is:
Πmixednot−engage ≡ φbE(P2|not−engage)RS+wRS(1−φ)Pr(0 skilled funds engage)P2 (0) b+cRS,
because a non-engaging fund can retain its delegated capital only if no other fund
engages in equilibrium. Comparing these payoffs to those of a Kη subgame equilibrium,
we note that Πmixedengage < φbRSPh+RS ĉ(Kη) and Π
mixed
not−engage ≥ cRS. To see that Πmixedengage <
φbRSPh +RS ĉ(Kη), note that E(P2|engage) ≤ Ph and P2 (j) = 0 for all j < Kη. Thus,
for c > φbPh + ĉ(Kη), such a mixed equilibrium cannot exist.
Proof of Proposition 5:
Proof of (1). The highest c for which engagement occurs at any given η is φbPh +
ĉ(Kη). φbPh is independent of η, while ĉ(Kη) is decreasing in Kη, which in turn is
weakly increasing in η.
Proof of (2). Given (1), one of the following statements must be true: Either c >
φbPh + ĉ(2) in which case engagement never occurs for any η ≤ α; or c ≤ φbPh + ĉ(N),
in which case engagement occurs for all η ≤ α; or c ∈ (φbPh + ĉ(N), φbPh + ĉ(2)], in
which case engagement occurs for some η’s, for which c ≤ φbPh + ĉ(Kη), but not for
higher η’s for which c > φbPh + ĉ(Kη).
Proof of (3). Engagement never fails in equilibrium, and thus in equilibrium, the
minimal engagement for each η involves Kη funds, where Kη is weakly increasing in
η. Further, if for any η, if c ∈ (ĉ(Lη + 1), ĉ(Lη)] for some Lη ∈ {Kη + 1, ..., N − 1} ,
Lemma 2 immediately implies that an Lη strategy constitutes a subgame equilibrium
9
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for any η′ > η such that Kη′ < Lη.
Proof of Proposition 6: The engagement conditions for a blockholder in the pro-
prietary case and the delegated case without competition for flow are, respectively,
c ≤ bPh and c ≤ φbPh + w(1 − φ)bPh. Since b is held constant, neither of these
equations depends on α or β. Now note that the engagement conditions for all of
the equilibria in the delegated case with competition for flow depend on ĉ(·), which is
defined for a given argument x as ĉ(x) ≡ w
(
(1− φ) bPh + 1x(M +N − x)b(1− φ)Ph
)
,
which can be expressed as ĉ(x) ≡ wb
(






range of c for which any of the equilibria identified in Lemma 2 exists is affected by
α and β holding b constant, and the upper boundary of the existence range for each
equilibrium is increasing in α + β.
Proof of Proposition 7: Proof of part (1): In the delegated game without com-
petition for flow, for each η ≤ α, whenever c ≤ φbPh + w(1 − φ)bPh ≡ c̄NR then a
Kη profile is played and engagement succeeds. In the delegated game with compe-
tition for flow, for each η ≤ α, whenever c ≤ φbPh + ĉ(Kη) a Kη, Lη, or N profile
is played and engagement succeeds. This proves the first statement. Since ĉ(Kη) =
w
(
(1− φ) bPh + 1Kη (M +N −Kη)b(1− φ)Ph
)
, we can rewrite c ≤ φbPh + ĉ(Kη) as




(M +N −Kη)b(1− φ)Ph
)
> c̄NR. This proves the second statement.
Proof of part (2): Engagement occurs in the proprietary game iff η < α and c ≤
bPh, while in the delegated game with competition for flow it occurs for a given η if
c ≤ φbPh + ĉ(Kη). This proves the first statement. Since
ĉ(Kη) = w
(
(1− φ) bPh +
1
Kη
(M +N −Kη) b(1− φ)Ph
)
,
the RHS of the condition for the delegated game with competition for flow is decreasing
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in Kη, so the condition is easiest to satisfy close to the lower end of the support of η,
where Kη = 2. Thus, to show that there are some η for which the range is non-empty,
it suffices to have
(1− φ)bPh < w
(
(1− φ) bPh +
1
2





Proof of Proposition 8: Proof of part (1): There is successful engagement with ex-
actly Kη engagers in the maximal success equilibrium of the delegated game with
competition for flow in this cost range according to Lemma 2 and Proposition 4.
There is no engagement in the proprietary game in this cost range according to
Proposition 2. Thus, it suffices to prove that engagement in the delegated game
with competition for flow is efficient over this entire range. To do so we show that
φbPh + ĉ(Kη) <
Ph(1+(α+(1−φ)β)(RS−1))
KηRS
, where the RHS is the maximum c for which
engagement is socially beneficial for a given η when Υ = α + (1 − φ)β, which is the
appropriate benchmark for the delegated game with competititon for flow since all
reallocatable capital is invested in skilled funds following successful engagement. Ex-





. This is clearly
increasing in w, so if the inequality holds at w = 1 it will always hold. We thus set
w = 1 and suppose, by way of contradiction, that






Ph (1 + (α + (1− φ)β) (RS − 1))
KηRS




Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2529230
Noting that bKη < α, this can hold only if
0 >
1− (α + (1− φ)β)
RS
,
which is a contradiction.
Proof of part (2): Welfare in the maximal success equilibrium of the proprietary
blocks game for this range of c and η is
Ph(1 + α(RS − 1)) + (N −Kη)cRS +Mc
since exactly Kη < N skilled funds engage. In the maximal success equilibrium of
the delegated game with competition for flow an Lη equilibrium (or N equilibrium) is
played, resulting in welfare of
Ph(1 + (α + (1− φ)β)(RS − 1)) + (N − Lη)cRS +Mc
(where Lη would be replaced by N for an N equilibrium). Letting RS → 1 provides
the result since Kη < N , and wherever an Lη equilibrium exists in the delegated game
with competition for flow, Lη > Kη holds. 
Online Appendix B: Asymmetric information model
In our baseline analysis we assumed that unskilled funds faced a prohibitively high
cost of engagement. An alternative formulation which may also be relevant for real
world applications is one in which skilled and unskilled firms face the same engagement
costs, but are differentially informed. In this extension, we show that for empirically
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relevant parameters, the qualitative results of such a formulation would be identical to
our baseline case.
The model remains broadly unchanged, with the following difference: both skilled
and unskilled funds can engage at cost c, but η is no longer publicly revealed at t = 1.
Instead, skilled funds enjoy an informational advantage by observing η privately at
t = 1, while unskilled funds do not. The parameter η is publicly observed at t = 2,
and used by fund investors along with the engagement outcome and the actions of all
funds to evaluate funds’ skill as before.
Given the presence of asymmetric information, we need to lay out some additional
notation and definitions. For notational convenience, we assign indices i = 1, ..., N to
skilled activists and indices i = N + 1, ..., N + M to unskilled activists. The t = 1
information set of fund i is Ii. For skilled funds, Ii = η, while for unskilled funds
Ii = ∅. Strategies profiles take the form σi : Ii → ∆{E,NE}. Fund investors observe
the action choices by all funds {ai}, the outcome of the engagement (P2), and η and
form beliefs about each fund γ(ai, P2, η) = Pr(θi = S|ai, P2, η) for i = 1, ...,M + N .
Note that fund investors cannot observe a fund’s index itself – otherwise inferences
would be trivial. As a result the posterior function γ(·) is not indexed by i. In
other words, inferences about any two funds that take the same action are identical in
equilibrium. A perfect Bayesian equilibrium is characterized by:
1. State contingent strategies σi(η) for i = 1, ...N, for each η,
2. State uncontigent strategies σi(∅) for i = N + 1, ..., N +M , and
3. Investor beliefs γ(ai, P2, η) for all ai, P2, and η.
such that:
13
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1. For each i ∈ {1, ..., N} and each η, σi(η) is a best response to σj(η) for j ∈
{1, ..., N}\{i} and σj(∅) for i ∈ {N + 1, ..., N +M}, given investor beliefs (which
determine capital reallocation as described above).
2. For each i ∈ {N+1, ..., N+M}, σi(∅) is a best response to σj(η) for j ∈ {1, ..., N}
and σj(∅) for i ∈ {N+1, ..., N+M}\{i}, given investor beliefs (which determine
capital reallocation as described above).
3. Investor beliefs γ(ai, P2, η) for each ai, P2, and η are computed according to Bayes
rule along the equilibrium path and arbitrary otherwise.
We can now state:
Proposition 9. For




(M +N − 2)b(1− φ)
)
unskilled funds never engage in equilibrium.
Proof: Consider a generic (possibly mixed) equilibrium in which some skilled funds
engage with some probability at some η’s and some unskilled funds engage uncondi-
tionally with some probability. Consider any arbitrary unskilled fund i. Conditional
on engaging, fund i will receive a cash flow payoff of φbE(P2|ai = E) on its pro-
prietary capital. Further, if (i) engagement succeeds conditional on engagement by
fund i and (ii) if, upon engaging, fund i attains the highest posterior in the cross
section of funds, then it will retain its own delegated capital and receive further in-
flows, which we denote f(ai = E|η, a−i). Denote event (i) by Λ and event (ii) i.e.,
γ(ai = E, a−i, Ph, η) = maxj∈1,..,i−1,i+1,..,M+N}γ(aj,ai = E, a−j, Ph, η), by Θ. If event
Λ does not occur, flows are worthless, while if event Θ does not occur, all delegated
14
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2529230
capital flows to funds other than fund i. Thus, fund i’s expected payoff from engaging
is as follows:
φbPr (Λ)Ph + Pr[Λ,Θ]w ((1− φ)bPh + E (f(ai = E|η, a−i)|Λ,Θ))
Now observe that:
1. Pr (Λ) ≤ Pr[η ≤ α + β],
2. Pr[Λ,Θ] ≤ Pr[Λ] ≤ Pr[η ≤ α + β], and
3. f(ai = E|η, a−i) ≤ 12(M +N − 2)b(1−φ)Ph, because the maximal flow that fund
i could gain on the basis of engagement is the total delegated activist capital
and – since success can only be obtained with at least two funds engaging – such
flows must be shared with at least one other fund.
Thus, the engagement payoff is bounded above by




(M +N − 2)b(1− φ)
)
The minimal payoff to not engaging is c. Thus, if




(M +N − 2)b(1− φ)
)
,
fund i will not engage with positive probability in equilibrium.
The intuition for this result is as follows. Unskilled funds are uninformed, and
hence cannot judge precisely when engagement is likely to earn them returns by way
of either gains on their proprietary capital or capital infows. Proposition 9 estab-
lishes a sufficient condition, whereby even if—whenever engagement can in princi-
15
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2529230
ple be successful (i.e., whenever η ≤ α + β)—unskilled funds were to be guaranteed
the full return on their proprietary capital (i.e., φbPh) and if in each such instance





(M +N − 2)b(1− φ)
)
) they would find the cost c too high. Clearly,
the lower in the ex ante probability that engagement can be successful, i.e., the lower
is Pr[η ≤ α + β], the harder it is incentivize unskilled funds to engage.
As long as the condition in Proposition 9 holds, all our analysis in Sections 3 and 4
go through unchanged. Further, note that if Pr[η ≤ α+β] is low enough then the lower
bound on c identified in Proposition 9 will be strictly lower than φbPh + w(1− φ)bPh,
which is the lowest upper bound on c required to induce skilled funds to engage in
Section 3. Then there is a non-empty range of parameters supporting all our analysis
in Sections 3 and 4.
High engagements costs are empirically relevant because hedge fund activism is
widely recognized to be costly to activists. For example, Gantchev (2013) estimates
that the average costs of activist campaigns by hedge funds range from $2 million
to $11 million depending on the difficulty of the campaign and whether it ultimately
culminates in a proxy contest. Nevertheless, we provide a brief characterization of
the low-cost case next. When c is low the set of potential equilibria is particularly
complex. We characterize maximal success equilibria that have successful engagement
for all η ≤ α + β, with a focus on the effect of competition for flow on the ability to
achieve this level of success. Such equilibria are not achievable without engagement by
unskilled funds. We have the following result.
Proposition 10.
(i) Without reallocation, if c ≤ α+b
U−bbPh(φ + w(1 − φ)) there exists a maximal success
equilibrium in which engagement succeeds for all η ≤ α+ β, all unskilled funds engage
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unconditionally, and skilled funds engage iff they are pivotal.
(ii) With reallocation, if c < min[φb b
U−bPh +
α+β−b
U−b wb(1− φ)Ph, w ((1− φ)bPh)], there
exists a maximal success equilibrium in which engagement succeeds for all η ≤ α+β, all
unskilled funds engage unconditionally, and all skilled funds engage when η ≤ α + β.
Proof: (i) Without reallocation, no fund will ever engage if they believe there is
zero chance they are pivotal. Thus, the only feasible equilibrium with success at all
η ≤ α + β will be one in which (1) all unskilled always engage unconditionally, (2)
skilled funds only engage when they think they could be pivotal, and therefore (3) only
the number of skilled funds actually needed at a given η will engage in equilibrium. In
other words, equilibrium behavior of skilled funds is as follows: for η ≤ β, the unskilled
by themselves are sufficient for success, so no skilled funds engage; for η ∈ (β, α + β],
the unskilled funds alone are not sufficient for success, so Kη−M skilled funds engage;
and for η > α + β, success is impossible so no skilled funds engage. Now consider
whether the required behavior can be supported in equilibrium.
First consider unskilled funds. They are supposed to engage unconditionally. For
the range η ∈ (β−b, α+β], every engaging fund is pivotal, and for the range η ≤ α+β
engagement succeeds. Unskilled funds’ engagement payoff will be
φbPr[η ≤ α + β]Ph + wb(1− φ)Pr[η ≤ α + β]Ph
while their non engagement payoff will be
φbPr[η ≤ β − b]Ph + wb(1− φ)Pr[η ≤ β − b]Ph + c
Thus, the unskilled will engage if c < Pr[η ∈ (β − b, α + β]bPh(φ+ w(1− φ)).
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Now consider skilled funds. Any skilled fund not expected to engage is happy not
to engage since they cannot change the succes outcome by doing so. Any skilled fund
expected to engage faces the same incentive as in Proposition 3 (since they are always
pivotal when expected to engage), i.e., those who are supposed to engage in equilibrium
will do so if c ≤ φbPh + w(1 − φ)bPh. This condition is clearly easier to satisfy than
the above condition for the unskilled, so the condition for existence of this equilibrium
is c < Pr[η ∈ (β − b, α + β]bPh(φ+ w(1− φ)) = α+bU−bbPh(φ+ w(1− φ)).
(ii) We assume the off-equilibrium belief that any fund that does not engage when
η ≤ α+β is unskilled. In the proposed equilibrium, unskilled funds all engage uncondi-
tionally while skilled funds are expected to behave as follows: for η ≤ α+β, all skilled
funds engage, while for η > α+ β, no skilled funds engage. Now consider whether the
required behavior can be supported in equilibrium.
First consider unskilled funds. For the range η ∈ (α + β − b, α + β], every fund
is pivotal, and for the range η ≤ α + β engagement succeeds. An unskilled fund’s
engagement payoff is
φbPr[η ≤ α + β]Ph + Pr[η < α + β]w ((1− φ)bPh) ,
because when every fund engages, there is no update about any fund’s skill and there is
no reallocation. Their non engagement payoff given our assumed off equilibrium belief
is
φbPr[η ≤ α + β − b]Ph + c,
so they will engage if c < φbPr[η ∈ (α+β−b, α+β]Ph+Pr[η < α+β]w ((1− φ)bPh) .
Now consider the skilled funds. When they are expected to engage but they are
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not pivotal (i.e., for η ∈ (b, α + β − b)), their engagement payoff is
φbRSPh + w ((1− φ)bPh)RS,
while their non engagement payoff under our assumed off equilibrium belief is
φbRSPh + cRS,
so they will engage if c < w ((1− φ)bPh). Note that when they are expected to engage
but are pivotal, i.e., η ∈ (α + β − b, α + β], they will be even more likely to engage.





α + β − b
U − b
wb(1− φ)Ph, w ((1− φ)bPh)].
Without competition for flow, there is a single equilibrium type that delivers this level
of success: a pure strategy equilibrium in which all unskilled engage unconditionally,
while skilled players engage only when pivotal. With competition, we have constructed
a pooling equilibrium where all unskilled players engage unconditionally while all skilled
players engage whenever there is success. This pooling equilibrium is supported by the
off equilibrium belief that any fund failing to engage when η ≤ α + β is unskilled.
Thus, the high level of engagement in this equilibrium is supported by the fear of
losing existing delegated capital rather than the hope of gaining delegated capital
from others.
Note that it is possible, as in the baseline analysis, for the existence range for the
game with competition for flow to be greater than the range for the game without.
This is more likely to be true when φ is small and β is large. A small φ means that
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there is little incentive coming from being pivotal, so flow incentives are relatively
more important for those cases. A large β expands the range over which engagement
succeeds, which increases the incentive for each fund to preserve its capital.
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